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The Relativity of Ren (Humaneness):  
Re-examining 2A6 and 6A6 of the Mengzi from  
the Perspective of Self-Introspection in Experience
Xiangnong HU*
Abstract
A textual difference exists between 2A6 and 6A6 of the Mengzi: In 2A6, the heart-mind 
of ceyin (compassion), xiuwu (shame), cirang (courtesy and modesty), and shifei (moral 
judgement) are said to be the four “duan” (germs) of ren (humaneness), yi (optimal ap-
propriateness), li (observance of the rites), and zhi (wisdom), whereas in 6A6, the term 
“duan” is not found. For this reason, some scholars today criticize the interpretation that 
translates “duan” as “starting point”, which implies a substantial difference between the 
four germs and ren, yi, li, and zhi that apparently does not exist in 6A6. Instead, these 
scholars prefer another interpretation that takes “duan” as an indication of the essential 
sameness between the four germs and ren, yi, li, and zhi that are originally possessed by a 
morally perfect heart-mind. This essay re-evaluates these two interpretations. First, it ar-
gues that compared to the first, the second interpretation’s argument for a morally perfect 
heart-mind is less compatible with the nature of Mengzi’s moral philosophy as a teaching 
that focuses on self-introspection and moral cultivation in experience. Second, this essay 
reinforces the first interpretation by demonstrating the existence of two different senses 
of ren (as well as yi, li, and zhi) in the Mengzi, thus allowing it to coherently suggest that 
the heart-mind possessing the four germs as innate moral feelings is the same as the “rel-
atively antecedent” ren, which is, at the same time, the starting point for developing the 
“relatively consequent” ren that is substantially different from the former.
Keywords: Mengzi (Mencius), 2A6, 6A6, xin (heart/heart-mind), ren (humaneness), mor-
al cultivation
Relativnost pojma ren (človečnost): ponovna raziskava odsekov 2A6 in 6A6 
knjige Mencij s perspektive izkušenjske samointrospekcije
Izvleček
Med odsekoma 2A6 in 6A6 knjige Mencij je naslednja tekstualna razlika: V odseku 
2A6 je srce-razum, ki goji ceyin (sočutje), xiuwu (sram), cirang (vljudnost in zmernost) 
in shifei (moralno presojo), obravnavan kot štiri »duan« (kali) vrlin, tj. ren (človečnost), yi 
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(optimalna primernost), li (upoštevanje obredov) in zhi (modrost). V odseku 6A6 pa po-
jma »duan« ni mogoče najti. Zato danes nekateri strokovnjaki kritizirajo interpretacijo, v 
kateri je pojem »duan« preveden kot »izhodišče«, kar implicira bistveno razliko med štiri-
mi kalmi ter ren, yi, li in zhi, ki pa v 6A6 očitno ne obstaja. Namesto tega so ti strokovn-
jaki veliko bolj naklonjeni razlagi, po kateri je »duan« označba za bistveno enakost štirih 
kali ter ren, yi, li in zhi, ki jih izvorno poseduje moralno izpopolnjen srce-razum. Ta esej 
ponovno ovrednoti ti dve interpretaciji. Prvič, članek zagovarja stališče, da je v primerjavi 
s prvo argument druge razlage za moralno popoln srce-razum manj skladen z naravo 
Mencijeve moralne filozofije kot nauka, ki se osredotoča na izkušenjsko samointrospek-
cijo in moralno kultivacijo. Drugič, ta esej podpre drugo razlago s ponazoritvijo obstoja 
dveh različnih pomenov pojma ren (kot tudi yi, li in zhi) v delu Mencij. S tem pa dopušča, 
da ta koherentno kaže, da je srce-razum, ki poseduje štiri kali kot ponotranjena moralna 
občutja, enak »relativno predhodni« vrlini ren in je hkrati izhodiščna točka razvoja »rela-
tivno posledične« ren, ki pa se občutno razlikuje od prejšnje.
Ključne besede: Mengzi (Mencij), 2A6, 6A6, xin (srce/srce-razum), ren (človečnost), 
moralna kultivacija
Introduction
In 2A6 of the book of Mengzi (Mencius), the early Confucian master Mengzi 孟
子 (ca. 372–ca. 289 BCE) says:
The [heart-mind] of compassion is the germ of [humaneness]; the 
[heart-mind] of shame, of [optimal appropriateness]; the [heart-mind] 
of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the [heart-mind] of 
[moral judgement], of wisdom. Man has these four germs just as he has 
four limbs … If a man is able to develop all these four germs that he pos-
sesses, it will be like a fire starting up or a spring coming through. When 
these are fully developed, he can tend the whole realm within the Four 
Seas, but if he fails to develop them, he will not be able even to serve his 
parents.1
This passage has been analysed by almost every Confucian commentator and phi-
losopher in history, but instead of examining these ancient analyses, I would like 
to focus on two prevailing interpretations among contemporary philosophers that 
1  惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之端
也…凡是四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始燃，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四
海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。 The translations of the Lunyu 論語 (Analects) and Mengzi are 
from D. C. Lau (with my occasional modifications). For the rest of the Chinese texts, the transla-
tions are my own.
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have been circulating since the time of New Confucianism (xin rujia 新儒家) in 
the 20th century.2
The first was proposed by Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1908–1979):
The heart-mind and nature of human beings are first seen in humans’ 
possession of the heart-mind of four germs of compassion, shame, cour-
tesy and modesty, and moral judgement. This heart-mind of four germs 
can be said to be the starting point [emphasis added] of the four virtues 
of humaneness, optimal appropriateness, observance of the rites, and wis-
dom, but it is not yet sufficient to be regarded as the complete virtues of 
humaneness, optimal appropriateness, observance of the rites, and wis-
dom. … This manifestation of the heart-mind of compassion and shame 
and of four germs that Mengzi speaks of, at the beginning, just represents 
a person’s psychological state or activity, which is a kind of internal feel-
ing of disturbance, unbearableness, and carelessness that is still insuffi-
cient for moral practices … It is only the purely subjective and passive 
feeling of disturbance and unbearableness. (Tang 1986, 221)3
In other words, Tang understands the term “duan 端” (germ) in the sense of “du-
anshi 端始” (starting point), which suggests that the four germs possessed by our 
xin 心 (heart/heart-mind) are instantaneous reactions that are yet to be developed 
and thus are substantially different from ren 仁 (humaneness), yi 義 (optimal 
appropriateness), li 禮 (observance of the rites), and zhi 智 (wisdom) as fully de-
veloped “complete virtues” (quande 全德).4
More recently, and deeply influenced by Tang, Roger Ames comes close to this 
interpretation when he argues that the heart-mind of human beings contains an 
2  This certainly does not mean that these two modern interpretations are completely new and with-
out any historical background. On the contrary, we can find the ancient versions of both interpre-
tations, and some of the scholars mentioned in this essay, regardless of which interpretation they 
prefer, occasionally draw support from the ancient Confucian commentators and philosophers, 
especially from those belonging to the school of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism (song ming lixue 
宋明理學). However, given the limited space, I will leave problems associated with the historical 






4  In another place, Tang also argues that compared to ren, yi, li, and zhi as the complete virtues, the 
undeveloped heart-mind of four germs is “tiny and weak” (xiao qie wei 小且微), emphasizing their 
difference (Tang 1989, 48–49).
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“ethical sensorium” as a generalization of its primal and morality-related condi-
tions, such as the four germs. However, this sensorium needs to be “articulated 
across the particular narrative of a distinctly human life as a collaboration between 
person and world” in order to grow into ren, yi, li, and zhi (Ames 2011, 142–43). 
Fu Peirong 傅佩榮 explicitly defends the interpretation that the term “duan” tells 
us that the four germs are “sprouts but not completion” that require “protection, 
nourishment, and extension” (Fu 2010, 75).5 Similarly, Philip Ivanhoe argues that 
the four germs are “weak and fragile” as “the beginning of morality”, and “require 
a period of growth in order to reach maturity” (Ivanhoe 1990, 30–31). Further-
more, Shun Kwong-loi 信廣來 takes ren, yi, li, and zhi as “four aspects of the 
ethical ideal”, suggesting that “the four germs (tuan [duan])” should be regarded as 
the “predispositions” that constitute “the starting point for ethical development”, 
directing us toward the ethical ideal, just like a sprout is the starting point from 
where a mature plant grows (Shun 1997, 48, 138).
On the other hand, some scholars (Cai 1990, 43–46; Li 1994, 113–14; Li 2018, 
76; Ng 2014, 104–6; Yang 1992, 58–63) challenge this interpretation by empha-
sizing that in 6A6, Mengzi says:
The [heart-mind] of compassion [is humaneness], the [heart-mind] of 
shame [is optimal appropriateness], the [heart-mind] of respect [is] the 
observance of the rites, and the [heart-mind] of [moral judgement is] 
wisdom. [Humaneness], [optimal appropriateness], observance of the 
rites, and wisdom do not give me a lustre from outside; they are in me 
originally.6
This time, the term “duan” disappears, and Mengzi does not mention that the four 
germs need to be further nourished in order to become ren, yi, li, and zhi, which 
all seems to imply that they are substantially the same and are all originally pos-
sessed by human beings, in contrast to what is suggested by Tang and others. For 
this reason, these scholars prefer an interpretation made by Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 
(1909–1995), which, in short, claims that the “duan” in 2A6 should be interpreted 
as a sort of “duanni 端倪” (indication) or “duanxu 端緒” (inkling) that can reflect 
this substantial sameness between the four germs and ren, yi, li, and zhi in 6A6.
In what follows, I will first elaborate on Mou’s interpretation in more detail to 
see how it is supposed to solve the problem faced by the first interpretation pro-
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by examining whether it is compatible with a general thesis regarding the nature 
of Mengzi’s moral philosophy that is identified and accepted by both Tang and 
Mou, which suggests that this philosophy should be understood as a teaching 
on self-introspection and moral cultivation in experience without presupposing 
any first moral substance and principle. Examined from this perspective, Mou’s 
interpretation turns out to be less adequate than that of Tang, as it barely fits 
within this general thesis (Section 3). Nevertheless, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the question as to how we can rely on Tang’s interpretation to bridge the 
textual difference between 2A6 and 6A6 has not yet been properly addressed. 
Therefore, I will reinforce this interpretation by virtue of demonstrating the 
existence of two different senses of ren (as well as yi, li, and zhi) in the Mengzi.7 
More specifically, I will argue that the ren in 6A6 is a “relatively antecedent” ren 
that is defined on a different basis from the “relatively consequent” ren in 2A6. 
Therefore, it is consistent to claim that the original heart-mind containing the 
four germs as innate moral feelings is substantially the same as the relatively an-
tecedent ren, which at the same time is the germ, or starting point, from where 
the relatively consequent ren can be developed (Section 4). Finally, this essay 
will end with a short conclusion.
Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of 2A6
As Mengzi points out in 2A6, the heart-mind of compassion arises when a person 
suddenly sees a young child on the verge of falling into a well. In such a case, the 
person feels compassion “not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the 
[child’s] parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers 
or friends, not yet because he disliked the cry of the child”.8 Rather, compassion 
will spontaneously arise in the person’s heart-mind as long as the person is a hu-
man being. According to Mou Zongsan, this spontaneous feeling of compassion 
7  According to Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), there are two ways to understand the relationships be-
tween ren and yi, li, and zhi: “Ren, if it is taken as a undistinguished whole, then this whole forms 
one unified atmosphere of life; yi, li, and zhi are all included within ren. If it is taken comparatively, 
then ren and yi, li, and zhi are on a par” (仁，混淪言，則混淪都是一個生意，義禮智都是仁；
對言，則仁與義禮智一般) (Zhu 1986, vol. 1, 107). Both Tang and Mou understand the relation-
ship in the first way (Tang 1986, 73; Mou 2013, 229), but apparently, at least in the case of 2A6 
and 6A6, Mengzi treats ren, yi, li, and zhi on an equal basis, as indicated by the structure of his 
argument. Even so, in order to avoid verbosity, I will only use ren for elaboration on most occasions, 
and what will be argued to hold true for ren will also hold true for yi, li, and zhi on an equal basis. 
Since the primary concern of this essay is to show that there are multiple senses of ren, yi, li, and 
zhi, the second-order question regarding on what basis these virtues can be further distinguished 
from each other goes beyond its scope.
8  非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡其聲而然也。
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is evidence that the essence of the heart-mind shared by all people that gives rise 
to this compassion is in fact no less morally perfect than the heart-mind of ren 
(renxin 仁心) of a moral sage, for a sage and a morally ordinary person will have 
exactly the same spontaneous reaction driven by their heart-mind under such a 
scenario. Furthermore, Mou asserts, in addition to compassion, this heart-mind of 
ren can also reveal itself in different circumstances as unbearableness (buren 不忍), 
disturbance (buan 不安), and other “moral” feelings that are not blind but involve 
some kind of normative judgements. Accordingly, all of the moral feelings that 
both Kongzi (Confucius) 孔子 (551–479 BCE.) and Mengzi have discussed in 
their dialogues are nothing but different manifestations of the same heart-mind 
of ren (Mou 2013, vol. 3, 220, 229).
Although it is beyond doubt that “the entirety of the heart-mind of ren” (renxin 
quanti 仁心全體) is originally possessed by all humans, Mou emphasizes that this 
heart-mind can reveal its practical significance only when it manifests itself as a 
“limited appearance” (juxian xiang 局限相) in experience, that is, in some specific 
circumstances such as seeing a child in danger (ibid., 221). From here, Mou argues 
that a morally ordinary person differs from a sage as the former is ignorant about 
the fact that,
The specific heart-mind of compassion that manifests in correspondence 
to a particular occasion seems to be limited by the particular occasion and 
manifests as a limited appearance, but it is in fact the flow of the entirety 
of the universal substance on this particular occasion; the inkling [the 
heart-mind of compassion] and the substance of ren will not become 
two essentially different things simply because of this limited appearance. 
(ibid.)9
Consequently, unlike a sage, a morally ordinary person does not realize that they 
already possess the heart-mind of ren (in the appearance of the heart-mind of 
9  而對應一特殊事機而呈現之具體的惻隱之心雖儼若為特殊事機所拘而顯一局限相，然而其
實即是那普遍之體之全部流注於此，不因有此局限相，端緒與仁體即成為異質之兩物也。
 Mou’s discussion of the ignorance of morally ordinary people and the need to make them become 
self-aware of their morally perfect heart-mind can also be found in Mou, Cong Lu Xiangshan dao 
Liu Jishan 從陸象山到劉嶯山 (From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan) (1979, 335–45). It should also 
be noticed that for Mou, the ignorance of morally ordinary people does not refer to their heart-
mind, i.e., it does not mean that their heart-mind itself is ignorant and morally impaired, for this 
would suggest that the heart-mind of ordinary people is morally inferior to the heart-mind of sag-
es, thus contradicting with the thesis that everyone’s heart-mind is morally perfect as such. Rather, 
Mou thinks that the ignorance is caused by the natural desires associated with other sense organs 
that cover up the heart-mind and impede the morally perfect heart-mind from freely manifesting 
itself (ibid., 230–31).
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compassion) and is unable to apply it to other occasions that also require them to 
be compassionate.
Following this line of thought, Mou believes that what Mengzi says in 2A6 re-
garding the development of the heart-mind of compassion does not refer to a 
process of moral cultivation that develops and transforms the heart-mind of com-
passion into the heart-mind of ren since they are already substantially the same; 
instead, it is a moral cultivation that enables us to “be compassionate on one occa-
sion and also be compassionate on every other occasion” (ibid.).10 With regard to 
this kind of moral cultivation, Mou acknowledges that the heart-mind containing 
the different moral feelings can be taken as the starting point from where the 
extensions of these feelings to more occasions take place, but we should always 
keep in mind that these kinds of extensions just increase the number of times the 
heart-mind manifests itself, while the quality of the heart-mind is already morally 
perfect in itself and does not require further improvement. Therefore, the term 
“duan” in 2A6 should rather be interpreted as “duanni” (indication) or “duanxu” 
(inkling), which designates the heart-mind of four germs as an indication of our 
originally possessed ren, yi, li, and zhi revealing themselves and requiring exten-
sions to more occasions in daily life (Li 1994, 113–14; Mou 2013, vol. 3, 220).
Under this interpretation, Mou and those who follow him believe that it is con-
sistent for Mengzi on the one hand to claim that “the heart-mind of compas-
sion is ren”, emphasizing their essential sameness, while on the other hand also 
claiming that “the heart-mind of compassion is the germ of ren”, emphasizing 
the manifestation of the heart-mind of ren and its need for extension in experi-
ence. The apparent difficulty faced by the interpretation proposed by Tang Junyi 
and others regarding this textual difference between 2A6 and 6A6 is therefore 
solved.
Re-examining Mou’s Interpretation under the General Background 
of Mengzi’s Moral Philosophy
From the above analysis, we can see that Mou Zongsan attributes to Mengzi the 
view of a morally perfect heart-mind that can actively manifest itself as various 
moral feelings in experience. This somehow addresses the interpretive issue asso-
ciated with the textual difference between 2A6 and 6A6, but it is another question 
as to whether the existence of such a heart-mind is compatible with the general 
background of Mengzi’s moral philosophy.
10  一處惻隱，處處惻隱。
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What is this general background? By this, I refer to an overarching thesis regard-
ing the nature of Mengzi’s moral philosophy that Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan 
agree on despite their different opinions on how to interpret 2A6. Tang thinks that 
Mengzi does not presuppose any first moral substance and principle (Tang 1989, 
21–24),11 and that the central aim of his teaching is to “uplift every human being’s 
heart-mind and will, raise them from below, and set them up towards the top” (Tang 
1986, 214).12 This is achieved by encouraging people to keep “self-introspecting” 
(fanxing 反省) in experience and become more and more “self-conscious” or “self-
aware” (zijue 自覺) of the fact that they are human beings, which are different in 
nature from brute animals and capable of becoming morally more excellent (ibid., 
218). Likewise, Mou believes that the philosophy of Mengzi—and Confucianism 
in general—should be appreciated as a “study of sageliness within” (neisheng zhi xue 
內聖之學) and “teaching of becoming virtuous” (chengde zhi jiao 成德之教) (Mou 
2013, vol. 1, 9). The primary concern of this teaching relates to moral cultivation, 
and “as to the problem of ontology, the understanding of it is an outcome of self-in-
trospection in the midst of performing moral practices self-consciously” (ibid., 11).13
Indeed, nowhere in the book does Mengzi propose any moral substance at first, 
nor does his moral reasoning rely on a top-down model starting with some uni-
versal moral principles. In fact, Mengzi explicitly opposes the idea of “holding to 
an inflexible oneness” (zhiyi 執一), which is a position he attributes to three of 
his major academic opponents at that time (Mengzi 7A26). As to Mengzi’s own 
position, we can see that in the case of ren, the term is associated with different 
moral feelings, and some of these feelings, such as compassion in the case of see-
ing a child in danger, are obviously different in content from others, such as the 
love one feels toward one’s parents (qinqin 親親) (Mengzi 4A27, 7A15), and the 
grudges that occasionally arise from loving one’s parents (qinqin zhi yuan 親親之
怨) (Mengzi 5A1, 6B3), suggesting that none of these feelings alone can be used 
to define the property of ren without the danger of overlooking other qualitatively 
different ren-related feelings. Additionally, in 6B6, Mengzi describes three histor-
ical figures with very different and even contrary characters that he considers as 
the exemplars of ren, and then states that “All that is to be expected of a [morally 
exemplary person] is [humaneness]. Why must he be exactly the same as other 
[morally exemplary persons]?”14 This again points to the fact that ren is not some-
thing fixed and universal that can be given beforehand to guide our behaviour.
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Instead, Mengzi often urges us to think about questions such as why, when both 
are humans with the same initial conditions, a sage can “set an example for the 
Empire worthy of being handed down to posterity” while we are so ordinary 
(Mengzi 4B28).15 To find the answer to this, we must “seek it within ourselves” 
(fan qiu zhu ji 反求諸己) (Mengzi 2A7). This self-examination certainly does not 
refer to the kind of meditation that can be practiced silently in a room on our own, 
since without presupposing any first substance and principle, it is doubtful wheth-
er such a meditation can even take place in a meaningful manner. On the contrary, 
the properties of our “selves” that we can reflect upon will become available to 
us only when we constantly interact with the external world. In this sense, such 
self-introspection is an inward examination that is inseparable from outer experi-
ences.16 This point is highlighted when Mengzi’s statement “There is no greater 
joy for me than to find, on self-examination, that I am true to myself ” is connected 
with “Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and 
you will find that this is the shortest way to [humaneness]” (Mengzi 7A4);17 when 
Mengzi points out that the sage king Shun needs to “hear a single good word and 
see a single good deed” and only then can he fully realize the propensities toward 
goodness that distinguishes him from animal-like savages (Mengzi 7A16);18 and 
when Mengzi attempts to ask King Xuan of Qi to look inward to his own heart-
mind of unbearableness and take it as the basis for moral practice, the very possi-
bility of such self-introspection and moral cultivation is based upon the king’s past 
experience of feeling unbearable toward an ox (Mengzi 1A7).
It is reasonable, therefore, to follow Tang and Mou and read Mengzi’s moral phi-
losophy primarily as a teaching that focuses on self-introspection and moral culti-
vation in experience without any presupposition. By taking this general thesis into 
account, I think the problem regarding the compatibility of Mou’s interpretation 
of 2A6 and 6A6 can be rephrased into a question: Can we realize, at some point of 
such self-introspection and cultivation in experience, that we have a heart-mind 
that is morally perfect, as Mou suggests?
15  舜人也，我亦人也。舜為法於天下，可傳於後世，我由未免為鄉人也。
16  Roger Ames makes a similar point and coins the alternative term “intra-spection” in place of “in-
trospection” in order to emphasize this inner-outer aspect of the self-introspection suggested by 
Mengzi and other Confucian masters (Ames 2016, 50). I agree with Ames that Mengzi’s self-in-
trospection cannot be accomplished by focusing entirely on the internal, but I will not adopt his 
term “intra-spection” as this may introduce other implications of Ames’s philosophy that I do not 
agree with, such as his overemphasis on the importance of familial and social relations at the ex-
pense of innate moral feelings.
17  反身而誠，樂莫大焉。强恕而行，求仁莫近焉。
18  及其聞一善言，见一善行。
Azijske_studije_2021_1_FINAL.indd   189 5. 01. 2021   14:02:20
190 Xiangnong HU: The Relativity of Ren (Humaneness)
As Tang points out, the very first step of self-introspection starts with reflecting 
on the distinction between human beings and brute animals (Tang 1986, 217). 
Needless to say, biological differences exist between humans and non-human an-
imals, but these apparent external differences are not what Mengzi is concerned 
about. Rather, what concerns Mengzi is the “slight” (jixi 幾希) difference that can 
really distinguish humans from brutes when both share the same desires for living 
and reproduction (Mengzi 4B19). Mengzi believes that it is not difficult to realize 
that, in experience, there are some moral feelings that can naturally arise in our 
heart-minds, such as those mentioned in 2A6 and 6A6, that pertain to human 
beings alone. In 2A6, Mengzi states that “whoever is devoid of ” the heart-mind 
of compassion, shame, courtesy and modesty, and moral judgement “is not hu-
man”,19 while the same is outlined in a more positive tone in 6A6, which proposes 
that these feelings are “possessed by all men alike”.20 For Mengzi, these innate 
moral feelings are what really highlight the uniqueness of humans and distinguish 
them from other animals.
At this point, regarding the characteristics of our heart-mind, I think we can 
know this much: It is an active entity that possesses and gives rise to various mor-
al feelings in experience. However, whether it is already morally perfect remains 
unclear and needs further investigation as the self-introspection proceeds to the 
next step, which is to reflect on the difference between morally ordinary people 
and moral sages. There are several occasions where Mengzi emphasizes the fact 
that sages are humans just like others, which implies that through proper moral 
cultivation it is possible for anyone to become a sage (Mengzi 1A7, 3A1, 4B28, 
4B32, 6A7). Nevertheless, just as we say in everyday life that “a good guy is differ-
ent from a bad guy”, there must be some difference between a morally noble and 
an ordinary or deficient fellow. From here, Tang and Mou, and those who support 
either of them, will have different considerations: In theory, it could be that the 
difference lies in the development of the initial heart-mind that the sages have 
achieved as the result of their moral practices, as Tang suggests. Alternatively, it is 
equally possible that the initial conditions remain exactly the same between sages 
and morally ordinary people; rather, their difference is marked by the fact that 
sages can make full use of their initial conditions in the sense that they can let 
their heart-mind manifest whenever and wherever it is required, whereas ordinary 
people cannot, as Mou suggests. Without presupposing any first substance and 
principle, this puzzle cannot be resolved unless one commences moral practices in 
experience and then self-introspects afterwards.
19  無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非之心，非人也。
20  惻隱之心，人皆有之；羞惡之心，人皆有之；恭敬之心，人皆有之；是非之心，人皆有之。
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Let us consider 1A7, in which Mengzi instructs King Xuan of Qi on moral cul-
tivation. The passage begins with the king asking Mengzi whether he is capable 
of becoming a true king who can always care for his people. Mengzi assures the 
king that he can, because Mengzi once heard that the king spared an ox from 
being sacrificed upon seeing the innocent animal tremble in fear. Mengzi tells 
the king that this very heart-mind of unbearableness is evidence of his capability 
to become a true king and thus that his “failure to become a true king is due to a 
refusal to act, not to an inability to act”.21 What the king needs to do is to extend 
this heart-mind of unbearableness to his people and relieve them from suffering 
in the same way as he relieved the ox.
Suppose that after some kind of moral training, the king successfully extends his 
heart-mind of unbearableness to his people. If we just look at the consequence of 
this extension, it is simply that the king’s heart-mind of unbearableness has arisen 
on one more occasion, which seems to support Mou’s thesis, but David Wong 
makes the point that the quality of the heart-mind, together with its feeling of 
unbearableness toward the people after moral cultivation, is unlikely to be the 
same as the original heart-mind and its feeling of unbearableness toward the ox, 
because the original unbearableness is just a spontaneous reaction that does not 
necessarily contain a clear reason for action, and the original heart-mind is not 
yet developed so as to be able to reflect on such reactions and refine them into 
action-guiding feelings (Wong 2002, 191–92).
It is true that upon seeing the ox and feeling unbearable, the king does act to spare 
it from suffering, just like in the case of 2A6 when, upon seeing the child about to 
fall into a well and feeling compassionate, the person will be driven by an urge to 
save the child. However, these examples tell us nothing more than this: With the 
original heart-mind and its innate moral feelings, we can act morally in situations 
where we are directly exposed to the moral patients in such a way that causes mor-
al feelings to spontaneously arise; this does not suggest that in other cases, where 
we either do not have such direct experiences or are in touch with the patients 
under circumstances that make them appear to be (but not in fact) less deserving 
of help—cases in which the feelings that immediately arise are not those purely 
moral ones—we can still rely on the original heart-mind to carry out appropriate 
actions. That is, when Mengzi asks the king to merely think about his poor people 
or, as Wong suggests, when the king, say, comes across a homeless person in the 
street who approaches and begs him for money, it is most likely that the feeling 
that spontaneously arises in the king’s heart-mind this time will be an indescrib-
able and vague one, which may be a blend of various different feelings instead 
21  故王之不王，不為也，非不能也。
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of pure unbearableness (Wong 2002, 193). Despite the king being intellectually 
aware (after Mengzi reminding him) that he should respond to his people with 
the same feeling and action that he once had toward the ox, without moral cul-
tivation the king is unable to refine his vague feeling into an unbearableness that 
can provide him with the reason and motivation to help his people.
In other words, what the moral cultivation Mengzi has in mind aims to achieve 
is to extend the king’s heart-mind of unbearableness to cases where the moral 
feeling will not spontaneously arise—where the spontaneous feeling (as an un-
reflected reaction) instead arises cannot be simply identified as unbearableness. 
This will require the king to be trained so that his heart-mind becomes morally 
sensitive enough to crystallize and refine those spontaneous but vague feelings 
into clear moral feelings that can guide his actions. Consequently, these newly 
extended moral feelings will be substantially different from the original ones 
as they are the result of careful reflections that are always practically effica-
cious, whereas the original ones are merely moral reactions that are, in terms 
of their spontaneity, not different from other natural reactions; although they 
can lead to moral actions on some occasions, as natural reactions, it is hard to 
tell whether these are driven by determined reasons or just psychological urges 
(ibid., 195–96).22 This is also why, I think by following Wong, that Mengzi says 
at the end of 2A6 that if one fails to develop the heart-mind of four germs, one 
cannot even serve one’s parents with the original heart-mind containing these 
unreflected moral reactions. Furthermore, in 6A14 and 6A15, Mengzi answers 
his student by stating that a morally exemplary person differs from a morally 
ordinary person precisely because the former’s heart-mind gets nourished and 
can si 思 (think/reflect). According to the current interpretation, this reflection 
is directed to the innate moral feelings, and supplies these with the originally 
lacking “action-guiding content” (ibid., 191).
Unfortunately, it appears that in the end King Xuan of Qi did not set forth to 
achieve moral cultivation. However, supposing that he had done so and had 
self-introspected during or after such cultivation, it would be reasonable to posit 
that the king would have realized that he was becoming more morally sensitive 
and trustworthy, and his heart-mind was becoming sharper and more primed 
for manifestation. In this sense, the king would have realized that he was be-
coming a better king with a kinder heart-mind. This realization of “becom-
ing better” simultaneously negates Mou’s thesis that there is a basis to propose 
that the heart-mind is morally perfect in itself and does not require further 
22  Exactly how this kind of moral cultivation should be carried out is beyond the scope of the current 
discussion. Basically, Wong thinks that it requires the interaction between the heart-mind and qi 
氣 (vital energy) and what he calls “analogical reasoning” (ibid., 193–94, 197–204).
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improvement.23 In comparison, the interpretation proposed by Tang Junyi and 
others, which admits that the original heart-mind of four germs can and needs to 
be further developed, works more effectively in such a context.24
Ren in a Relative Sense: A Reinforcement of the First Interpretation
Let us now turn to consider how the textual difference between 2A6 and 6A6 can 
be possibly addressed under Tang Junyi’s more adequate interpretation of “duan”.
To my knowledge, many of those who support Tang’s interpretation did not spend 
too much effort on bridging this textual difference; the way by which they deal 
with it is simply to read 6A6 as if the term “duan” is still implied there despite 
its apparent disappearance (Ames 2011, 140; Fu 2010, 75, 172; Shun 1997, 189). 
That is, according to them, in 6A6, when Mengzi says the heart-mind of com-
passion, shame, respect, and moral judgement are ren, yi, li, and zhi, and ren, yi, li, 
and zhi are “in me originally”, we should understand Mengzi as if he still means 
that these four moral feelings are the germs of ren, yi, li, and zhi, and it is these 
four germs, not ren, yi, li, and zhi, that are originally possessed by the heart-mind.
This solution, however, is not ideal in my opinion. The main reason for those 
scholars to add “duan” in 6A6 is presumably because they believe that this will 
make 6A6 become more consistent with the general background of Mengzi’s 
23   Surely, one could still argue that everything about the heart-mind that one realizes during moral 
practices has originally been possessed by the heart-mind. In other words, what one discovers is 
nothing more than what was already there in the heart-mind. However, without presupposing any 
first substance, on what basis can this argument be established? Perhaps we can still postulate an 
all-inclusive and morally perfect heart-mind, but such a postulation will not in turn have any prac-
tical significance and is definitely not what Mou and those who support his interpretation have in 
mind, for Mou strongly opposes the idea of treating the heart-mind as a merely abstract, static, and 
metaphysical postulation (Mou 2013, vol. 3, 214–15).
24  In his analysis of Wong’s account of moral cultivation, Ng Kai-chiu 吳啟超 believes that Wong’s ar-
gument will actually support Mou’s interpretation of 2A6 (Ng 2014, 95–102). Based on the above 
discussion, it should become clear now that this is a misreading of Wong. As noted, although the 
end result of the moral cultivation in 1A7 will be the heart-mind of unbearableness arising on one 
more occasion, which seems to conform to Mou’s idea that one should “be compassionate on one 
occasion and also be compassionate on every other occasion”, the crucial difference is that Wong 
thinks that the extended heart-mind of unbearableness will be substantially different (morally 
more developed) than the original heart-mind of unbearableness, whereas Mou believes that the 
heart-mind is already morally perfect and will remain constant during the moral cultivation. Given 
his belief in a morally perfect heart-mind and his praise of Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) 
reading of the Mengzi, Mou agrees with Wang that the main task of moral cultivation is to recover 
the originally perfect heart-mind by virtue of gradually removing the obstructions (the turbid qi) 
from it so that the innate moral feelings can more freely manifest themselves (Mou 1978, 15; 1979, 
335–45). This is the type of moral cultivation that Wong openly opposes (Wong 2002, 191).
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moral philosophy as one that emphasizes moral cultivation and development. 
However, this to some extent also brings the uncharitable implication that if we 
do not add “duan” then 6A6 as it is will not appear to be entirely consistent with 
the general context of the Mengzi, which also indicates that the Mengzi lacks 
an overall consistency due to the disappearance of “duan” in 6A6.25 This kind of 
thinking gets expressed when, for example, Chen Daqi 陳大齊 (1886–1983), who 
also supports Tang’s interpretation that the heart-mind originally only possesses 
the germs of ren, yi, li, and zhi, argues that “To say ‘the heart-mind of moral judge-
ment is the germ of wisdom’ is acceptable, to say ‘the heart-mind is the wisdom’, 
however, is overstated. … To say the heart-mind of compassion and of the other 
feelings is the germ of ren, yi, li, and zhi is acceptable, but to say it is the same as 
ren, yi, li, and zhi is not” (Chen 1953, 19).26 Similarly, Fu Peirong comments that 
by “examining them [2A6 and 6A6] as a whole, the teaching of ‘good germ’ [in 
2A6] is more comprehensive, and reading it in comparison with Mengzi’s other 
phrases, it is also more consistent” (Fu 2010, 172).27 For this reason, in order to 
make 6A6 become as consistent as 2A6 and achieve an overall consistency, “duan” 
has to be read into it.
This certainly does not mean that a more adequate solution to the textual issue 
cannot be found if one adopts Tang’s interpretation. On the contrary, it appears to 
me that some of these scholars could do better because the appropriate solution to 
this problem is already implicitly embedded in some of their works; what we need 
to do is to dig it out, develop it, and use it to reinforce Tang’s interpretation by 
25   One may find an excuse for such lack of overall consistency by appealing to the fact that the 
Mengzi is an ancient text that had been edited and recompiled many times by different writers and 
commentators throughout the history, not to mention the difficulties associated with preserving it 
(for the history of the development of the Mengzi, see Zhao and Sun 1999, 3–11). This suggests 
that the Mengzi we read today may indeed lack an overall consistency, but we should not expect 
the text to be as consistent as a modern academic work anyway. Therefore, in the case of 6A6, we 
can accept that the missing of “duan” breaks the overall consistency of the Mengzi without blaming 
ourselves for being uncharitable interpreters. I will not take such defence into serious consideration 
for the following reasons: First, instead of being an argument based on textual support, it is more 
like an assumption whose validity cannot be proved or disproved with the texts that we have at the 
moment. Second, I feel that such defence has the danger of being abused, for it can be employed 
whenever one finds a particular passage or sentence in the Mengzi does not match one’s overall 
interpretation of the text. The attitude toward the Mengzi that I find more beneficial to take is to 
treat it as a work that strives for overall consistency, and not to overlook any small textual difference 
and apparent inconsistencies. As I will show, in this case, the more effort one spends on carefully 
considering the one-word difference between 2A6 and 6A6 will not go in vain, for through such 
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reflecting more deeply on the question of what the writer or editor of the Mengzi 
is really trying to suggest at 6A6 with the missing character “duan”, without as-
suming that it might just be due to an inconsistency.
Let us stay with ren for a demonstration of this. In the previous section, we have 
already seen that for Mengzi the property of ren cannot be fully reflected by a sin-
gle feeling or action—it is something flexible but not fixed. One can also get the 
feeling that there may be multiple senses of ren being invoked in the Mengzi by 
noticing that, on the one hand, being ren sometimes simply means being a man or 
loving and serving one’s parents (Mengzi 4A27, 7A15, 7B16), while on the other 
hand Mengzi, just like Kongzi, is reluctant to acknowledge himself as an exemplar 
of ren, indicating that achieving ren is indeed not an easy matter (Mengzi 2A2). In 
addition, he also states that “With [humaneness], the point, too, lies in seeing to 
its being ripe” (Mengzi 6A19),28 which seems to suggest that we already possess 
a kind of raw and immature ren, and what we need to do is to nourish it further.
Tang Junyi argues that since Mengzi’s self-introspection takes place in experience 
without presupposing anything at first, and experience itself is always “changea-
ble without fixed directions” (bianhua wu fang 變化無方), the outcomes of this 
self-introspection—our views such as what properties we originally possess, what 
their characteristics are, how they can be further developed, and what the new-
ly developed properties look like—will also be changeable and revisable as we 
proceed with our moral practices, encounter new circumstances, and gain new 
materials for self-introspection (Tang 1989, 24). Fu Peirong likewise argues that 
for Mengzi, humans are lively creatures that have the ability to freely develop 
themselves while interacting with the world. Therefore, when we look at the in-
ternal human conditions, we should be aware that these are also dynamic and 
embrace change (Fu 2010, 186–87). Following the same line of argument, Roger 
Ames goes one step further to claim that “Ren is both antecedent and an out-
come” (Ames 2011, 182). That is, ren is the starting as well as end point of moral 
cultivation; it is a developmental and transformative virtue, and as it develops, it 
will carry different connotations depending on the context of its usage.
This kind of thought can be textually supported. Consider 7A15, where Mengzi 
tells us on what basis he calls something ren (and yi):
What a man is able to do without having to learn it is what he can truly 
do; what he knows without having to reflect on it is what he truly knows. 
There are no young children who do not naturally love their parents, 
and when they grow up will not [naturally] respect their elder brothers. 
28  夫仁，亦在乎熟之而已矣。
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Loving one’s parents is [humaneness]; respecting one’s elders is [optimal 
appropriateness].29
This highlights that loving one’s parents is regarded as ren solely on the basis that it is a 
sensibility that people are born with without the need for learning and reflection, and 
apparently, just like feelings such as compassion and unbearableness, the love that one 
feels toward one’s parents is also a moral feeling that pertains to human beings alone.30 
On this ground, we can use ren to designate our initial moral state, which is repre-
sented by the manifestations of the innate moral feelings of the original heart-mind.
The passage above continues with the last sentence: “Wu ta, da zhi tianxia ye”,31 
which has been understood and translated differently by various commentators. 
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 (1909–1992), for example, take 
it as another explanation of why loving one’s parents is ren. For them, the phrase 
means that loving one’s parents is ren for no other reason than the fact that everyone 
in the whole Empire can feel the same, emphasizing once more that it is called ren 
because it represents the initial moral condition shared by all people (Yang Bojun 
1960, 284; Zhu 2011, 331). On the other hand, Zhao Qi 趙岐 (ca. 108–201) and 
Jiao Xun 焦循 (1763–1802) believe that the phrase means that since ren is already 
possessed by humans, there is nothing left to be done except for extending it to the 
whole Empire ( Jiao 2017, 744; Zhao and Sun 1999, 359); this is also the interpre-
tation adopted by D. C. Lau (1921–2010) in his English translation of the passage: 
“What is left to be done is simply the extension of these [loving one’s parents as 
ren and respecting one’s elder brothers as yi] to the whole Empire” (Lau 2003, 293).
It is not my concern here to examine which of these two interpretations is phil-
ologically more accurate. Rather, what I would like to emphasize is that in order 
for either of them to be contextually coherent, a different sense of ren needs to be 
acknowledged. To see why, consider the following from 7B31:
For every man there are things he cannot bear. To extend this to what he 
can bear is [humaneness].32
29  人之所不學而能者，其良能也；所不慮而知者，其良知也。孩提之童，無不知愛其親者；
及其長也，無不知敬其兄也。親親，仁也；敬長，義也。
30  Arguably, we love our parents in some particular ways and with some particular feelings that are 
different from brutes, just like Zhu Xi points out that “The reason why humans are different (from 
brutes) is because they have ren, yi, li, and zhi, so that when they are sons, they show filial piety; 
when they are brothers, they show respect to their elder brothers; how can brutes be able to show 
these!” (人所以異者，以其有仁義禮智，若為子則孝，為弟則悌，禽獸豈能之哉！) (Zhu 
1986, vol. 4, 1347).
31  無他，達之天下也。
32  人皆有所不忍，達之於其所忍，仁也。
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Now, if one follows Zhu Xi and Yang Bojun’s interpretation of the last sentence 
of 7A15, without acknowledging a different sense of ren, it would be difficult 
to understand why the extended heart-mind of unbearableness, which has been 
shown in the previous section to be substantially different from the original one, 
is also regarded by Mengzi as ren in 7B31. Similarly, if one follows Zhao Qi and 
Jiao Xun’s interpretation of 7A15 while adhering to a single sense of ren, then 
the question we can ask is: What will the extension of the ren in 7A15 be called? 
7B31 tells us that it will still be called ren, but then an immediate problem arises 
as it is inappropriate to use the same term in exactly the same sense to refer to two 
substantially different virtues that represent different moral states. It is therefore 
more consistent to read 7A15 and 7B31 as describing two different senses of 
ren that carry different connotations; specifically, the one in 7A15 refers to the 
original heart-mind of moral feelings that designates the same initial moral state 
shared by all human beings, and the one in 7B31 refers to its extension that desig-
nates a more advanced moral state that is achieved by virtue of moral cultivation.
Support for this reading of ren also comes from 1A7. After King Xuan of Qi 
spared the ox from sacrifice, Mengzi assured him that “The [heart-mind] behind 
your action is sufficient to enable you to become a true king” and “[the action driv-
en by the heart-mind] is the way of a [humane] [emphasis added] man”,33 which 
again points to the sense of ren that represents the king’s original heart-mind of 
moral feelings. However, as discussed above, Mengzi still urges the king to culti-
vate and extend this kind of ren so that he can
Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable 
age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your 
own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the 
young of other families, and you can roll the Empire on your palm. … In 
other words, all you have to do is take this very [heart-mind] here and 
apply it to what is over there. Hence one who extends his bounty can 
tend those within the Four Seas; one who does not cannot tend even 
his own family. There is just one thing in which the ancients greatly sur-
passed others, and that is the way they extended what they did.34
This is what Mengzi thinks a true sage king will practice, which is a kind of gov-
ernance generally considered by Confucians as the “governance by ren” (renzheng 
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King Xuan of Qi already has; it corresponds to the ren illustrated in 7B31, which 
can be obtained only by extending one’s original heart-mind of moral feelings 
through moral cultivation.
Some may suspect that if we allow the extended and developed heart-mind of 
moral feelings to represent another sense of ren, then this will cause problems for 
also continuing to regard the original heart-mind and its innate moral feelings 
as ren, since the latter appears to be less qualified compared to the former. As far 
as I am concerned, this does not pose a problem because there is no textual evi-
dence suggesting that these two senses of ren are mutually incompatible. In both 
1A7 and 7B31, Mengzi just says that the extension of the original heart-mind is 
ren but does not suggest in any way that because of this the original heart-mind 
itself can no longer be regarded as ren. More importantly, given that Mengzi’s 
self-introspection starts in experience without presuppositions, we will not real-
ize the sense of ren described in 7B31 until we firmly cultivate our initial moral 
conditions. In other words, at the beginning, at the very first stage that we realize 
we are different from brutes, we only have the original heart-mind possessing 
those unreflected, innate moral feelings that can be referred to as ren. This ren 
provides us with the basis for revision, and it is only in relation to the revision of 
this ren that the heart-mind of moral feelings that is later developed and extended 
through moral practices can be referred to as ren in a “relatively consequent” sense. 
Correspondingly, when we look back from this later stage of moral cultivation, the 
original state from where we depart can be taken as ren in a “relatively antecedent” 
sense.
Another point that needs to be noticed is that the innate moral feelings that 
spontaneously arise from the original, undeveloped heart-mind in given situa-
tions surely constitute the starting point of moral cultivation for everyone, but I 
think we should not for this reason call the ren that is used to designate this initial 
moral state an “absolutely antecedent” ren, because once the moral cultivation 
begins, it is a continuous and endless progress in practice, and so the ren that is 
realized in the midst of this moral cultivation will also be continuously developed 
and revised so that one cannot get its “absolutely consequent” sense. For exam-
ple, the life of Kongzi vividly displays a constant process of moral development 
without a predetermined end (Analects 2: 4), which is also reflected by his disciple 
Zengzi 曾子 (505–435 BCE) when he says: “[A morally exemplary person] takes 
[humaneness] as his burden. Is that not heavy? Only with death does the road 
come to an end. Is that not long?” (Analects 8: 7).35 Death indeed brings an end to 
one’s worldly life, but the sense of ren realized at some point during one’s lifetime 
35  仁以為己任，不亦重乎？死而後已，不亦遠乎？
Azijske_studije_2021_1_FINAL.indd   198 5. 01. 2021   14:02:20
199Asian Studies IX (XXV ), 1 (2021), pp. 181–201
is always at the same time consequent to the one that preceded it and is anteced-
ent in relation to the one that will follow, so the ren that one finally realizes at 
the time of one’s death can also be taken as relatively antecedent and immature 
compared to the next, more consequent ren that one would potentially realize if 
one could live longer. As humans with limited lifespans, the only thing we can do 
is to proceed along the endless path of moral cultivation as far as possible, and as 
we proceed, there will always be a more consequent ren waiting ahead of us. To 
avoid using terms such as “absolute” or “absolutely” and use “relative” or “relatively” 
instead is precisely to capture this aspect of moral development.
Finally, equipped with this understanding of ren, we can now hold to Tang Junyi’s 
interpretation of 2A6 while explaining why “duan” exists in 2A6 but disappears 
in 6A6. It should become clear that the ren in 6A6 is used in the relatively ante-
cedent sense, which represents the original heart-mind of compassion as people’s 
initial moral condition. However, in 2A6, Mengzi emphasizes the need for moral 
cultivation, so the same heart-mind of compassion becomes the “duan”, or starting 
point, of the relatively consequent ren, which points to the state that one achieves 
after some moral practice, in which one’s heart-mind will become morally more 
sensitive and capable, and the moral feeling will also be different from the innate 
one as it is no longer a psychological urge but contains in itself a clear reason for 
action. Therefore, it is consistent to claim that the heart-mind of compassion is 
the same as the relatively antecedent ren, which is simultaneously the starting 
point from where the relatively consequent ren can be developed. Since ren, yi, li, 
and zhi are spoken of on an equal basis in 2A6 and 6A6, what holds true for the 
heart-mind of compassion and ren also applies to the other three feelings and yi, 
li, and zhi. Overall, we can say that the heart-mind of the four germs is substan-
tially the same as the relatively antecedent ren, yi, li, and zhi and is the starting 
point from where the relatively consequent ren, yi, li, and zhi can be developed.
Conclusion
The discussions in this essay have hopefully made it clear how the textual dif-
ference between 2A6 and 6A6 of the Mengzi should be handled. In my opin-
ion, compared to the interpretation arguing for the existence of a morally perfect 
heart-mind, the interpretation of 2A6 proposed by Tang Junyi and others, which 
takes the term “duan” as the “starting point” that indicates the need for further 
improvement of the original heart-mind, is more consistent with the general 
background of Mengzi’s moral philosophy as a teaching on self-introspection and 
moral cultivation in experience without presupposing any first moral substance 
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and principle. Furthermore, this interpretation will not be invalidated by the miss-
ing of “duan” in 6A6, for under this interpretation, ren, yi, li, and zhi in the Mengzi 
can all be understood as developmental virtues that have different meanings de-
pending on the context of their usage—a point that can be firmly supported by 
the original text. By explicitly demonstrating the existence of different senses of 
ren, yi, li, and zhi in the Mengzi, we are able to take the heart-mind of the four 
germs to be the same as the relatively antecedent and sprout-like ren, yi, li, and 
zhi described in 6A6, which at the same time constitute the starting points for 
developing the relatively consequent and ripe ren, yi, li, and zhi described in 2A6. 
In this way, we can well explain the textual difference between 2A6 and 6A6 while 
maintaining the more adequate interpretation of 2A6.
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